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Abstract: 
Structural realism is a flavour of scientific realism that argues we can know about the 
unobservable world because we can know about its structure. This paper presents the hitherto 
dormant ‘ontological problem’ for structural realism. It does so by recalling the now 
(in)famous ‘Newman Problem’ which is said to undercut the entire structural realist project 
by showing the favoured definition of structure to be trivial and weak. In the paper, I suggest 
the Newman Problem is actually symptomatic of a more pressing ontological problem—that 
structural realism has yet to provide an adequate account of what kind of a ‘thing’ structure 
is. With the issue laid out, I present two interpretations of structural realism that I think do 
attempt to provide an ontological basis for structure. I argue that while they may have 
difficulties that need working out, both are largely promising. 
Keywords: philosophy of science, structural realism, ontological problem, Newman 
Problem, ontic structural realism 
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Introduction 
 
Epistemic structural realism (ESR) claims that we can know about the unobservable 
because we can know about its structure. Nevertheless, construed as an epistemic thesis, ESR 
has remained largely silent on the ontological status of the structure it so heavily relies on. In 
this paper, I argue that the challenge of describing the ontology of these structures is a serious 
one that demands a serious response. I proceed by recalling the so-called ‘Newman Problem’ 
to support the view that ESR’s favoured set-theoretic and Ramsey-sentence account of 
structure is untenable. I then present the Newman Problem as symptomatic of another threat 
to ESR which I call the ontological problem—that ESR has yet to give a satisfactory account 
of what kind of ‘thing’ structure is. With the problem stated, I present two alternative 
interpretations of structural realism, ontic structural realism (OSR) and the argument from 
mathematical representation (AMR). I argue that these, both with kinks that still need 
working out, do a better job at coming clean on the ontological status of structure than ESR 
does. In section 1, a classical statement of ESR is given, along with its history and 
motivation. Section 2 examines the preferred set-theoretic and Ramsey-sentence account of 
structure employed by ESR. I then turn my attention to the Newman Problem in section 3 and 
present it as symptomatic of the ontological problem that has hitherto lay dormant in 
structural realism. Finally, in section 4 the alternative interpretations of structural realism are 
presented as potential candidates for a way forward against the ontological problem. Their 
main difficulties are also briefly discussed. 
 
1. Epistemic Structural Realism 
ESR emerges as an attempt to reconcile the history of science with the appeal of 
scientific realism. In the case of the former, antirealists have pointed out that many 
historically successful scientific theories, once thought to be approximately true, have since 
been proven otherwise. The now-canonical example offered is the shift from Fresnel’s 
theory of light as constituted by vibrations in a luminiferous aether to Maxwell’s 
electromagnetic theory (Worrall, 1989; Poincaré, 1905). The historical record of once-
successful, now-abandoned theories should offer the realist no reason to be optimistic about 
the prospects of our best contemporary theories. This has come to be known as the view 
from the pessimistic meta-induction. Worrall’s account of ESR attempts to give credence to 
the strength of the meta-induction whilst upholding scientific realism on the parallel 
strength of the so-called no-miracles argument—the view that only scientific realism ‘does 
not make the success of science a miracle’ (Putnam, 1975, p. 73). The position which offers 
the ‘best of both worlds’ according to Worrall is ESR. Here the continuity between a theory 
and its discarded predecessor is the retention of ‘structure’. Returning to the example, 
Worrall says:  
 
‘…it seems right to say that Fresnel completely misidentified the nature of light, but 
nonetheless it is no miracle that his theory enjoyed the empirical predictive success 
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that it did; it is no miracle because Fresnel’s theory, as science later saw it, attributed 
to light the right structure.’ (p. 117). 
 
Worrall’s thesis then is a sort of compromise between realism and the pessimistic meta-
induction that states plainly: if we want to be realists, we can only be realists about the 
structure of our best theories.  
 
2. Structure 
What exactly is structure then? According to Worrall (1989) and Poincaré (1905), it 
is best understood as a set of equations that encode the structure of a theory’s target domain 
(Frigg and Votsis, 2011). It seems clear to Worrall that the history of science affords many 
examples whereby structure, understood as the mathematical formulation of a scientific 
theory, is retained across radical theory change. In these cases, the ‘common pattern’ is for 
‘…the old equations [to] reappear as limiting cases of the new’ (Worrall, p. 120, emphasis 
from source). For example, Newton’s equations describing motion are shown to be limiting 
cases of Einstein’s equations for general relativity.  
Most modern proponents of ESR now endorse a set-theoretic definition of structure1 
that goes as follows: a structure 𝑆 is determined by a domain of objects 𝐷, and relations 𝑅 
on that domain. It is commonly presented as an ordered pair 𝑆 = < 𝐷, 𝑅 >. The salient 
point here is that relations on 𝑆 are purely extensional—that is to say the extension of a 
relation is just the ordered n-tuples it ranges over, or as Frigg and Votsis (2011) call them, 
‘featureless dummies’ with ‘virtually no intensional interpretation’. (p. 229). By defining 
structures in this extensional sense, their epistemological import is immediately restricted 
to their logico-mathematical properties. For example, given the relation 𝑅 = {(𝑎, 𝑏), (𝑏, 𝑎)}, 
we are free to make the claim that 𝑅 is a symmetric relation. What we are not free to do is 
make an intensional claim such as ‘𝑎 is bigger 𝑏’ or ‘𝑎 loves 𝑏’ etc.  
The set-theoretic definition gives the ESRist a way to talk about structure in 
isolation, but what of structure embedded within scientific theories? The favoured approach 
here is the so-called Ramsey-sentence, introduced by Maxwell (1970). The Ramsey-
sentence has also been endorsed by Worrall (2007) as the appropriate method of 
interpreting scientific theories in such a way that elucidates their structural elements. Let 𝑇 
be a scientific theory to-be-Ramsified. We want to begin by partitioning all predicates 
within 𝑇 into observational and theoretical classes respectively. Allocation should be 
relatively straight-forward,2 things like ‘reading on a mercury thermometer’ or ‘click on a 
Geiger counter’ fall into the former while ‘is negatively charged’ or ‘is a hydrogen atom’ 
fall into the latter. Denote theoretical predicates with 𝑃′𝑠 and observational predicates with 
𝑄′𝑠. We can then express 𝑇 in the following way: 𝑇(𝑃1, … , 𝑃𝑛, 𝑄1, … , 𝑄𝑚). Ramsifying 𝑇 
then has us replacing all theoretical terms with variables and existentially quantifying over 
them. The resulting Ramsey-sentence for 𝑇 is the following: 
∃𝑋1, … , ∃𝑋𝑛𝑇(𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑛, 𝑄1, … , 𝑄𝑚). Read naturally, the Ramsey-sentence says that there 
exists some theoretical relations such that 𝑇 holds with respect to those relations and 
observable ones (Frigg and Votsis, 2011). By way of example from Maxwell, let 𝑇 =
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∀𝑥[(𝑃1𝑥&𝑃2𝑥) → ∃𝑦(𝑄𝑦)] where ‘𝑃1𝑥’ means ‘𝑥 is a Radium atom’, ‘𝑃2𝑥’ means ‘𝑥 
radioactively decays’ and ‘𝑄𝑦’ is an observational predicate meaning ‘𝑥 is a click in an 
appropriately located Geiger counter’. 𝑇-Ramsified gives us the following: 
∃𝑋1&∃𝑋2𝑇[(𝑋1𝑥&𝑋2𝑥) → ∃𝑦(𝑄𝑦)]. Supporters of the Ramsey-sentence approach within 
ESR argue that the Ramsey-sentence of a theory captures its ‘full cognitive content’ 
(Worrall, 2007, p. 147)—that is to say, a Ramsified theory captures both the observational 
elements of some theory along with its structural elements. The take-away here is the 
connection between the set-theoretic and Ramsey-sentence approach. Both approaches 
retain a commitment to a purely extensional interpretation of structure: the former by 
construing structural elements as ‘featureless dummies’ and the latter by maintaining that 
‘theoretical predicates…should not be given an intensional interpretation’ (Ainsworth, 
2009, p. 139). 
 
3. The Newman Problem and the Ontological Problem 
The extensional interpretation of structure gets ESR into some serious trouble. The 
most famous and damaging of which has become known as the Newman Problem, or 
‘Newman’s objection’ after a criticism first put to the early Russellian (1927) form of ESR 
by Max Newman (1928). The problem has been taken up more recently by Demopoulos and 
Friedman (1985) and Ketland (2004). Put simply, the objection goes like this: consider any 
structure that organises a certain number of objects. Take any other collection of objects of 
equal number, now this collection may too be organised as to have the same structure. More 
formally:  
 
for any structure 𝑆 and any collection of objects 𝐶, if the domain of 𝑆 has the same 
cardinality as 𝐶, the objects within 𝐶 can be organised as to have the same structure as 
𝑆.  
 
The problem emerges because structure has been defined purely extensionally—as we have 
already seen, in a structure 𝑆 =< 𝐷, 𝑅 >, relations 𝑅 do not instantiate any physical or 
material elements. We are not granted useful information that would be available had the 
definition of structure been intensional rather than extensional. For example, suppose 𝑅 was 
the ‘heavier than’ relation over some arbitrary domain. In this case, we would be furnished 
with the information that the objects in our domain are of unequal weight (Ainsworth, 2009). 
The implication of the Newman Problem then is this: to talk about any particular relation as 
having ‘encoded’ the structure of a theory’s target domain becomes trivial and unduly 
specific (Ainsworth; Frigg and Votsis, 2011). More seriously, it has the effect of 
undercutting the ESR project by showing its version of structure to be weak and without 
much in the way of epistemic import. The Newman Problem has equally unwelcome 
implications for the Ramsey-sentence approach to structure, as shown by Demopoulos and 
Friedman. For the purposes of this paper, Newman’s original objection is sufficient.3 Various 
attempts have been made to salvage ESR from the Newman Problem,4 but for now we turn to 
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another challenge for ESR that the aforementioned problem is symptomatic of: structural 
realism still needs to come clean on the ontological status of structure itself.  
Presentations of structural realism in the literature thus far have been couched in 
largely epistemic terms—the principal claim of course being that structure is all we can know 
about the world. In that literature, less attention has been paid to what structure is beyond the 
popular set-theoretic and Ramsey-sentence approaches I have already covered. According to 
Frigg and Nguyen (2017), the reason behind this is one of job description: ‘…philosophers of 
science need not resolve this issue and can pass off the burden of explanation to philosophers 
of mathematics.’ (p. 67). The problem with this attitude is that thus far, for philosophers of 
science rather than mathematicians, it has been largely unproductive. In fact, if we take the 
Newman Problem to be symptomatic of an untenable approach to what structure is, the 
attitude has been wholly detrimental. Structural realists instead stand only to benefit from 
coming clean on what kind of a ‘thing’ structure is—a consequence of which is avoiding or 
assuaging the Newman Problem by clarifying the intentional/extensional distinction. From 
now on I will refer to the ontological problem for structural realism as the challenge to 
describe the kind of ‘thing’ structure is. So far, I’ve discussed the most popular account of 
structure in terms of set-theoretical entities and Ramsey-sentences. The Newman Problem has 
shown these to expose a soft underbelly. I have argued that weakness comes from a hitherto 
neglected ontological problem. I now want to turn to two alternative formulations of 
structural realism that do try to come clean on the ontological status of structure. 
 
4.1 Ontic Structural Realism 
Ontological, or ontic structural realism moves away from ESR by taking structure to 
be ontologically basic. Rather than claiming that structure is all we can know about the world; 
structure is all there is to it. In its most defensible form, largely due to French and Ladyman 
(1998), eliminative ontic structural realism (EOSR) construes relations as the basic units of 
reality. According to this view, relations need not have relata between which they hold—the 
objects that would ordinarily be related in some way or another are dropped from the 
ontological framework. Furthermore, EOSR abandons the purely extensional view of 
structure held by ESR. Rather, relations may be intensional and have some natural or material 
content to them. For example, the relation of ‘being larger than’ is a legitimate and desirable 
relation between objects in some domain, according to EOSR (Frigg and Votsis, 2011). 
Putting criticism aside for a moment, it is worth considering how EOSR tries to provide an 
answer to the ontological problem. The reasoning is twofold: 
(i) There is an obvious and important shift in attitude that moves one from ESR to 
EOSR. In its crudest formulation, the former suggests that all we can know about the 
world is its structure while the latter argues that structure is all there is to that world. 
Put in this way, EOSR doubles as both an ontological and epistemic thesis—if it is 
true that all there is to the world is structure, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
structure is what we can know about that world. The important move here is to take 
on the additional burden of ontology in the approach.  
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(ii) EOSR makes explicit use of intensional instantiation and in doing so, escapes 
the Newman Problem (Frigg and Votsis 2011; French and Ladyman, 1998). Recall 
that the Newman Problem undercuts ESR by showing that the extensional reading of 
structure makes the set-theoretic/Ramsey-sentence approach essentially useless for 
‘encoding’ the structure of a scientific theory. What EOSR does well then is 
construe structural relations as substantive and intensional. Viewed in this way, 
relations like ‘heavier than’ are acceptable. If we accept this version of structure, 
EOSR says that we can encode the structure of a scientific theory in some 
substantive, ontologically meaningful way that avoids the Newman Problem. 
EOSR is a promising but problematic interpretation of structural realism. Of its 
kinks to be worked out, there is one that prominently sticks-out: there cannot be relations 
without relata (Busch, 2003; Psillos, 2001). This criticism construes EOSR’s ontological 
framework as incoherent since ‘…the very idea of structure presupposes some elements 
that go together…A relation might take anything as its relata, but it always takes 
something’ (Busch, p. 213, emphasis from source). Those defending EOSR have responded 
in largely two ways. The first response argues that the ‘no relations without relata’ criticism 
is based on an extensional reading of structure. If so, critics are correct to say EOSR would 
be incoherent since even simple relations, say 𝑅 = {(𝑎, 𝑏), (𝑏, 𝑎)}, relate elements of the 
domain 𝐷 = {𝑎, 𝑏} even if these are just featureless dummies. EOSR, however, supports an 
intensional interpretation of relations. Accordingly, relations like ‘heavier than’ are taken to 
be substantive and ontologically meaningful in some sort of fundamental way, thus 
dispensing of the need for relata between them. Since this paper is not devoted to a 
discussion of EOSR, I leave the issue here. However, it may be important to note just how 
dramatically the notion of structure as being ‘ontologically basic’ will depart from most 
philosopher’s intuitions.  
Those intuitions will be tested again by EOSR’s second response to the ‘no relations 
without relata’ criticism. The rejoinder, due to Ladyman and Ross (2007), says that relata 
does exist between relations but that this relata is also structure. If we look at some relation 
and the objects it relates, we will find that these objects themselves are structures. This 
response then suggests ‘The world is structure all the way down’ (Frigg and Votsis,  2011, 
p. 263). It is worth highlighting again how dramatic a departure this view is from the 
prevailing intuition towards the subject. In order to defend against the ‘no relations without 
relata’ criticism, supporters of EOSR must make some bold ontological claims about the 
world. It is difficult to see how the ontological framework EOSR supports would be 
digestible or attractive to philosophers of science. Nevertheless, I’ve presented it here as an 
impressive and largely promising attempt to answer the ontological problem in structural 
realism. Further work on its theoretical difficulties is sure to win EOSR more supporters. 
 
4.2 The Argument from Mathematical Representation 
Another interpretation of structural realism that proffers an answer to the 
ontological problem is the argument from mathematical representation (AMR). A classical 
statement of the position is due to van Fraassen (1997) who writes: ‘to present a scientific 
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theory is, in the first instance, to present a family of models—that is, mathematical 
structures offered for the representation of the theory's subject matter’ (p.  526). The 
principal claim of the view then is that scientific theories are to be thought of as 
mathematical structures whereby the property of ‘being a structure’ here refers to ‘being a 
collection of models’. The AMR then gives a clear-cut response to the ontological problem: 
structures are models. Some important qualifications are in order: 
(i) Though now construed as a collection of models, the set-theoretic definition of 
structure is retained (Frigg and Nguyen, 2017). 
(ii) If structures are to be thought of as models, they have the additional burden of 
representing. A model, if it is to be such, must represent its target system in some 
way. According to the AMR, a model represents its target system by being 
isomorphic to it (van Fraassen, 1997; Frigg and Nguyen, 2017; Frigg and Votsis, 
2011). Two structures 𝑆1 =< 𝐷1, 𝑅1 > and 𝑆2 =< 𝐷2, 𝑅2 > are isomorphic iff there 
is a bijective mapping 𝑓: 𝐷1 → 𝐷2 such that 𝑓 preserves the framework of relations 
in such a way that: for all relations 𝑟1 ∈ 𝑅1 and 𝑟2 ∈ 𝑅2, the elements 𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛 of 𝐷1 
satisfy the relation 𝑟1 iff the corresponding elements 𝑏1 = 𝑓(𝑎1), … , 𝑏𝑛 = 𝑓(𝑎𝑛) in 
𝐷2 satisfy 𝑟2, where 𝑟1 is the relation in 𝑅1 corresponding to 𝑟2 in the relation 𝑅2 
(Frigg and Nguyen; Frigg and Votsis).  
(iii) A collection of models is sufficient to adequately represent all parts of a 
scientific theory. 
With these qualifications in place, the AMR offers another interpretation of structure that 
comes clean on the ontological problem: a structure is a collection of models that represent a 
scientific theory. Similarly, to EOSR, there are clearly some difficulties to be figured out.  
First, supposing we accept that a structure is to be thought of as a collection of 
models; what exactly is the ontological status of those models? Throughout this paper I’ve 
persistently demanded that structure be accounted for in some ontologically meaningful sense 
i.e. one that would let us understand what kind of ‘thing’ it is. Nevertheless, the same demand 
can equally be made to the abstractness and diversity of scientific models. In fact, it has 
already been made by Frigg and Nguyen (2017) who argue that the ontological problem rears 
its ugly head in the area of model-representation:  
 
‘What kinds of objects are models? Are they structures in the sense of set theory, 
fictional entities, descriptions, equations or yet something else? Or are there no 
models at all?’ (p. 54).   
The same question has been posed by Suárez (2003) who asks what exactly the ontological 
link is between different kinds of models, say ‘…a toy model of a bridge; an engineer’s 
plan for a bridge…the billiard-ball model of gases…and the quantum state diffusion 
equation for a particle subject to a localization measurement’ (p. 225). Even if structural 
realism tries to defer its ontological commitments to the field of model-representation, it is 
unclear whether the latter itself has an adequate answer to the ontological problem. 
It is worth noting another difficulty. Even if we permit that model-representation 
can give an answer to the ontological problem, it faces a further question: what version of 
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scientific representation is the right one? We have already said that models are only models 
insofar as they represent their target systems. Though there is a vibrant and developing 
literature that discusses theories of scientific representation5, there is little consensus on 
what theory of representation is best. The AMR relies on one version of representation, 
namely isomorphism between a model and its target system. Whilst we do not have space 
to discuss its merits or lack thereof, the isomorphic account of representation has been 
taken to task in Frigg (2006) and particularly Suárez (2003). The above criticisms show the 
AMR as being in danger of trying to take on too much. First, it must seek to solve the 
ontological problem as it occurs in model-representation; then it must take on the challenge 
of finding a satisfactory version of scientific representation. It is difficult to see how this 
load will not be too much. In spite of this, I am optimistic about the AMR’s chances as a 
solution to the ontological problem in structural realism. That optimism is owed chiefly to 
the quality and productivity of research in this area. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that structural realism has yet to provide an adequate 
ontological account of structure. I did so by first revisiting the classical statement of ESR 
from Worrall (1989) and then presenting the two most popular formulations of structure in 
terms of set-theoretic entities and Ramsey-sentences. I discussed the Newman Problem and 
suggested it was symptomatic of the hitherto dormant ontological problem for ESR. Finally, I 
put forward two alternative interpretations of structural realism, EOSR and the AMR, that do 
try to answer the ontological problem. Both interpretations have some difficulties to be 
worked out and this paper has remained neutral on whether those difficulties can be given 
satisfactory solutions. Instead, I have referred to them with the hope that they encourage 
discussion and refinement of both EOSR and the AMR as potential solutions to the 
ontological problem. EOSR has been criticised on the basis of having an incoherent ontology. 
I’ve presented the main responses to this charge on behalf of EOSR but concluded by 
suggesting the more difficult task may be convincing philosophers of science to adopt the 
radical ontological framework that EOSR requires. For the AMR, resolving some of its issues 
seems a tall order, particularly because it shares its main difficulties with the field of model-
representation. These are not simple problems: to understand what models are and to find a 
suitable theory of representation. Though challenging, these problems are not unsolvable, and 
model-representation is a productive research area within philosophy of science that promises 
to yield potential solutions. With luck and some necessary zeal, these solutions, along with 
solutions to the problems of EOSR, will provide a path forward on the ontological problem 
for structural realism. 
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Notes 
1 Most, though not all. The set-theory homogeny has been criticised by Landry (2007) as being overly 
restrictive. 
2 Straight-forward only in this setting. I ignore the difficult debate on the observational/theoretical distinction. 
See Maxwell (1962) for a detailed discussion. 
3 Readers interested in how the Newman Problem trivialises the Ramsey-sentence approach should be directed 
to Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) and Ketland (2004).   
4 For critical discussion of these attempts, see Ainsworth (2009) and Frigg and Votsis (2011). 
5 See Frigg and Nguyen (2017) for a survey of them all. 
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